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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
between felons and misdemeanants seems sufficient to relieve the
charge that the distinction does in fact violate the equal protections
clause.
It seems clear that the Wisconsin statute does in fact serve to
deny to misdemeanants due process, and that the distinction should
be dropped. This is all the more apparent in light of other states'
provisions which generally do not make any distinction between
defendants for the purpose of change of venue. 22  Furthermore,
the trend seems to be toward dropping the felony-misdemeanor
classification for purposes of determining which defendants are en-
titled to such things as jury trial or adequate counsel. 23 Both the
statute and the decision in this case are against the weight of
authority and the principles of justice, and both should be changed.
TERRY M. ANDERSON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - REMOTE PROXIMATE CAUSE -
ALCOHOLISM CAUSED BY ORIGINAL COMPENSABLE INJURY-Plaintiff
incurred a back injury arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment at the defendant's plant for which he received the allowable
compensation. Shortly after surgery, plaintiff returned to favored
employment1 at a greater wage than he had received previously.
More than seven years after his return to work the plaintiff was
discharged for being under the influence of intoxicants while at his
place of employment. A claim for workmen's compensation was
submitted contending that there was a causal relationship between
plaintiff's drinking problem and his compensable back injury.2 The
trial court found for the plaintiff and on appeal the Michigan Court
of Appeals affirmed. Scroggins v. Corning Glass Company, 10 Mich.
App. 174, 159 N.W.2d 171 (1968).
The Court of Appeals relied upon the plaintiff's self-diagnosis
that his consumption of alcoholic beverages was to relieve the pain
caused by his back injury. The plaintiff testified that he hadn't
22. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 267 (1959) ; CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1033 (West 1956) ; GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-1201 (1953) ; IDAO1 CODE ANN. § 19-1801 (1947) ; ILL. REV. STAT. oh. 38, § 114-6
(1963); LA. REv. STAT. § 15:290 (1950); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 762.7 (194,6) Miss. CODE
ANN. § 2508 (1957); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-01 (1960); N.Y.,CODE OF CR. PROc. § 344
(Me-Kinney 1958) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.25.070 (1961); State ex. rel. Ricco v.
Biggs, 198 Ore. 413, 255 P.2d 10,55 (1955).
23. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury) ; State v. Borst, 278 Minn.
278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967) (counsel) ; Stevenson v. Halzman, --- Ore.-,
458 P.2d 414 (1969) (counsel).
1. A return to a position commensurate with employee's former work both in salary
and status. Scoggins returned as a plant guard.
2. No claim was submitted contending that the type of work contributed to the drink-
ing problem.
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any drinking problem previous to his injury. It was stated that in
the absence of fraud or contrary evidence this disability is com-
pensable referring to the "statutory dilemma" which requires
that if a direct causal connection is established between the injury
and employment, then recovery must be allowed, and therefore
the court is duty bound to affirm the board's finding of fact.3
The Michigan court quoted from Larson on Workmen's Com-
pensation4 regarding cases that have held:
Where drugs used in the treatment of a compensable in-
jury led to narcotics addiction or alcoholism, the ensuing
consequences were compensable.
5
The cases enumerated by Larson and relied upon by the Mich-
igan court are distinguishable from the case under consideration.
In one case compensation was awarded to an employee who, while
at work and not feeling well, took what he thought was wine which
in fact was a deadly poison.8 In the instant case, however, Scrog-
gins was not at work and, further, his drinking problem was repe-
titive. In another case an injured employee applied "homespun rem-
edies" for approximately one month prior to consulting a physician.
Compensation was awarded, however, since the employee had been
injured while in the course of his employment and his physician
testified that the existing condition could have occurred even if
there had been immediate consultation.
7
Note should be made regarding Larson's quotation alluding to
"drugs used in the treatment" which in itself is distinguishable
from the instant case. In Scroggins, the plaintiff was not prescribed
any drugs which led to his alcoholism.
Compensation has been denied an employee who mistakenly
took the wrong medicine. A mild sedative had been prescribed by
the employee's physician but the claimant mistakenly swallowed a
bichloride of mercury tablet which had been prescribed five years
previously by the same physician for a similar injury. The court
pointed out that the employee's mind was not deranged nor was his
eyesight affected and that by his independent intervening act he
severed the causal chain.8
Somewhat analogous to the case under consideration is where
the employee incurs a compensable injury and subsequently commits
suicide. In the instant case the claimant had performed voluntary
3. Scroggins v. Corning Glass Co., 10 Mldh. App. 174, 159 N.W.2d 171, 173 (1968).
4. 1. A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 13.21 at 192.86 (1968).
5. Id.
6. Elliot v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 21 Cal.2d 281, 131 P.2d 521 (1942).
7. Tierney v. Independent Warehouse Co., 16 App. Div.2d 844, 227 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1962).
8. Brown v. N.Y. State Training School for Girls, 285 N.Y. 37, 32 N.E.2d 783 (1941).
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acts during the interim between his compensable injury and his
alcoholism which led to his subsequent disability. The suicide situ-
ation is similar in that following a compensable disability the em-
ployee commits the act of self-destruction by his own volition. In
a Minnesota case,9 compensation was denied where the deceased
committed suicide three and one-half years after suffering a back
injury which arose out of and in the course of employment. This
result, notwithstanding testimony by one psychiatrist that the suicide
was induced by emotional problems caused by the back injury and
that the suicide resulted from an uncontrollable impulse. A psychi-
atrist testifying for the defense opinioned that there were other
emotional problems caused by domestic difficulties which may have
led to the suicide. The court stated that the possibility of a causal
connection was too remote and speculative, and that the plaintiff
must show that the suicide resulted from an uncontrollable impulse
without conscious volition in order to establish a direct and unbroken
causal chain. 10
In two cases awarding compensation for suicide, allegedly caused
by an original compensable injury, the time interval between the
events was much shorter-one week in one case11 and seven days
in the other.12 In addition, one jurisdiction did not have a statute
expressly precluding compensation if the injury or death was in-
tentionally self-inflicted.
3
North Dakota cases have held that the burden of showing that
an injury was incurred in the course of or arose out of the employ-
ment is upon the claimant, and that awards should not be made
upon mere surmise and conjecture.14 In 1934 the North Dakota court
denied compensation to an employee who claimed that an ulcer
formed in his eye as the result of his employment as a hog scraper.
Evidence was introduced that bristles were airborne and in the
past many of them had lodged in various parts of the body. The
court held that this evidence was too speculative to establish a
causal connection. The court then recited what is ostensibly the
present rule:
Where . . . the injury may equally well have been oc-
casioned by factors entirely different from the one advanced
9. Lehman v. A.V. Winterer Co., 272 Minn. 79, 136 N.W.2d 649 (1965). This case is
also reported in 15 A.L.R.3d 611.
10. Id. at -, 136 N.W.2d at 651.
11. Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960).
12. Harper v. Industrial Comm'n, 24 fI.2d 103, 180 N.E.2d 480 (1962). Harper was re-
leased from the hospital and pronounced fit to return to work, by his physician, on March
11, 1957. He committed suicide on March 18, 1957.
13. Id. at -, 180 N.E.2d at 482.
14. Pace v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 51 N.D. 815, 201 N.W. 348, 350 (1924).
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as a theory and entirely removed in time from the course
of the employment, . . . no recovery can be had.1
The issue of a compensable injury subsequently followed by
self-induced alcoholic consumption has not been litigated in North
Dakota but in 1963 the question of willful intoxication by the claimant
which allegedly caused the subsequent injury was discussed. 16 The
deceased was involved in a head-on collision while in the course
of his employment. A blood test was improperly administered which
precluded the introduction of evidence relating to the deceased's
intoxicated state, hence the compensation claim was allowed.
17
However, in its dicta the court alluded to what is presently North
Dakota Century Code 65-01-02(8), stating that if the results of the
blood test had been admissible the claimant would not have
recovered, because willful intoxication acts as a bar to recovery.'
The pertinent portion of the statute reads:
'Injury' . . . shall not include an injury caused by the
employee's willful intention to injure himself . . . nor any
injury received because of the use of narcotics or intoxi-
cants .... 19
The North Dakota Legislature in exercising its police and sov-
ereign powers declared:
that the prosperity of this state depends in a large measure
upon the well-being of its wage workers; and to secure
this prosperity . . . sure and certain relief for workmen
injured in hazardous employment and for their families and
dependents.
20
In addition, the courts have subscribed to the theory that:
The Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally con-




This liberal construction is illustrated by the case of a waitress
being shot while in the course of her employment. 22 It was clear
that the incident did not arise out of the employment but com-
pensation was allowed because the claimant needed only to show
that the injury arose out of (because of) or in the course of (during
period of) not both. The court stated:
15. Kamrowski v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 64 N.D. 610, 255 N.W. 101 (1934).
16. Erickson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1963).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 295.
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8) (Supp. 1969).
20. Brown v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 152 N.W.2d 799, 801 (N.D. 1967).
21. Erickson v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 292, 294 (N.D. 1963).
22. Lippmann v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 55 N.W.2d 453 (N.D. 1952).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
[W]e think it was the intention and purpose of the legis-
lature to enlarge and extend the coverage of the statute
and to afford compensation to an employee for an injury
which such employee might sustain because of his employ-
ment even though he was not on the premises where his
actual work was to be or was being performed and was not
actively engaged in such work, but the injury was inflicted
upon him because of his employment; and that the legis-
lature thought it was as desirable and as proper that the
industry should carry such off-hour risk as it was that it
should carry the working-hour risk.23
Even with the liberal construction it is difficult to visualize the
North Dakota court extending such "liberalism" to include a case
such as Scroggins. It seems reasonable to assume that Scroggins
was not in the course of his employment during the seven and one-
half years whenever the consumption of alcoholic beverages oc-
curred. Therefore, the relevant quaere would be, whether or not
the ingesting of alcoholic beverages arose out of his employment.
North Dakota's answer seems to be found in cases which deny
compensation.
24
To establish a causal connection expert medical testimony,
although not expressly stated, appears to be a requirement. 25 Gen-
erally alcoholism is considered to be a disease and the statute
requires that the disease must be "fairly traceable to the employ-
ment" in order to be compensable. 26 Before a causal chain can
be established the evidentiary rule of the statute requires that the
disease arise under conditions where it is apparent to the rational
mind that there is in fact a causal connection. 27  Compensation
cannot be awarded on surmise, conjecture or a mere guess. 28
A 1966 North Dakota decision denied compensation which in-
volved the expiration of the deceased from a ruptured aneurism 29
some two and one-half months after injuring his ankle during the
course of his employment. The court stated:
[S]uch causal relationship cannot be based on mere surmise
or speculation. Where the alleged cause of death is purely
23. Id. at 460.
24. Kuntz v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 139 N.W.2d 525 (N.D. 1966); Feist v.
N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 80 N.W.2d 100 (N.D. 1956),: McKinnon v. N.D. Workmen's
Comp. Bureau, 71 N.D. 28, 299 N.W. 856 (1941); Kamrowskt v. N.D. Workmen's Comp.
Bureau, 64 N.D. 610, 255 N.W. 101 (1934).
25. Kuntz v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 139 N.W.2d 525 (N.D. 1966); Feist v.
N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 80 N.W.2d 100 (N.D. 1956); McKinnon v. N.D. Workmen's
Comp. Bureau, 71 N.D. 228, 299 N.W. 856 (1941); Kamrowski v. N.D. Workmen's Comp.
Bureau, 64 N.D. 610, 255 N.W. 101 (1934).
26 N.D. CENT. COpE § 65-01-02(9) (Supp. 1969).
27. Feist v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 80 N.W.2d 100, 102 (N.D. 1956).
28. Id.
29. "A localized abnormal dilation of a blood vessel (as an artery) filled with fluid or
clotted biped, usu. forming a pulsating tumor, and resulting from disease of the Vessel
wall." WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1961).
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speculative and may equally well have been occasioned by
factors entirely different from those on which the claim
against the Fund is based, no recovery can be had.8 0
This case had two expert medical witnesses for the claimant,
one who felt there was a "reasonable suspicion" that the ankle
injury was a factor in the subsequent ruptured aneurism. The other
expert testified that the probabilities of such causal relationship
were equal. 1
In other jurisdictions various reasons have been offered for
denying recovery for subsequent ailments to original compensable
injuries. Tort concepts were discussed in Missouri:
[W]ell reasoned authority recognizes, there must be no in-
tervening independent cause to break the chain of causation
between the new injury or aggravation and the original
injury in order that liability be imposed upon the employer
for the consequential results.1
2
In another case, the same court stated that the causal con-
nection between the compensable injury and the subsequent harm
is a question of fact.33 Michigan has found that behavior which
affects the morale of fellow workers, such as gambling, harms
the employer's business.3 4 In addition, voluntary drunkenness, moral
turpitude, and the fact that the claimant has suffered no wage
loss,3 5 have been cited as reasons for denying compensation. In
Iowa expert medical testimony to the fact that an original injury
"could have caused" a subsequent disability is insufficient to es-
tablish a causal relation. The expert medical testimony would have
to be corroborated by non-expert testimony which would then con-
stitute a fact question as to causal connection. The court stated
that testimony of the expert and non-expert combined would be a
minimal case for the claimant.
3 6
The strongest authority for concurring with the subject case is
found in a 1961 Tennessee case. 7 The deceased received a back
injury in the course of his employment and subsequently underwent
surgery. Approximately ten months after his surgery, the decedent
was discharged from care with a twenty percent permanent partial
disability. Deceased consumed whiskey to relieve his pain and later
30. Kuntz v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 139 N.W.2d 525, 528 (N.D. 1966).
31. Id.
32. Wilson v. Emery Bird Thayer Co., 403 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Mo. 1966).
33. Oertel v. John D. Streett & Co., 285 S.W.2d 87, 96 (Mo. 1955).
34. Todd v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 328 Mich. 283, 43 N.W.2d 854.
35. Garrett v. Chrysler Corp., 337 Mich. 192, 59 N.W.2d 259, 260 (1953).
36:. Nicks v. Davenport Produce Co., 254 Iowa 130, 115 N.W.2d 812, 815 (1962).
37. Pennell v. Maryland Cas. Co., 208 Tenn. 116, 344 S.W.2d 352 (1961).
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died. The court awarded compensation stating that there was a
causal connection relating the original back injury with the ensuing
demise. Prior to surgery the deceased had suffered from halluci-
nations and was treated in the hospital for delirium tremens. Thor-
zine was prescribed for a nervous condition and the doctor testified
that, even though not prescribed, whiskey would have the same
effect. The cause of death was hepatitis. 3 Testimony was admitted
at the hearing that the deceased suffered from malnutrition and
when this status is combined with alcohol one's life can be in very
great danger. The physician testified that it was reasonable to con-
clude that the deceased and his wife thought the thorzine was pre-
scribed as a pain killer and that the whiskey accomplished the same
result. The court conceded that this was a close case but justified
the result because of the requirement that the statute be construed
liberally in favor of claimants.3 9 Four points distinguishing the
above fact situation from the Scroggins' case should be emphasized.
First of all, there was testimony that the deceased was not an
alcoholic. Secondly, the deceased had not returned to work. Thirdly,
the interval between the deceased's discharge from the hospital
and his demise was only fifty-eight days. Finally, a permanent dis-
ability had been established.
As espoused by Cheit 40 a definite liberal trend for compensating
claimants continues:
The originally narrow interpretation of that famous phrase
'accidental injury arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment' has broadened to include the victim of occupational
disease and the worker whose pre-existing disability is ag-
gravated by his job. It has even brought benefits to a
Denver University football player injured in scrimmage; to
a New York office boy hurt when the paper clip he was
shooting with a rubber band backfired; and to the widow of
the California executive whose suicide was traced to a work-
caused manic-depressive state.
41
Fault is not considered in determining whether an employee's
disability arose out of and in the course of his employment with
regard to the original injury.42 However, it seems to be stretching
legal principles to allow recovery to an employee who persists in
self-diagnosis and treatment for a period of seven and one-half
years without consulting a physician.
38. Id. at -, 344 S.W.2d at 354.
39. l'& at -, 344 S.W.2d at 355.
40. E. CHEIT, INJURY AND REcOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT (1961).
41. Id. at IX.
42. Eridkson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 292, 295 (N.D.
1963).
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The general rule is quoted by Larson:
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an ag-
gravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury,
is compensable if it is a direct and natural result of a
compensable primary injury.
43
Quaere whether seven and one-half years of alcoholic consump-
tion is a direct and natural result of the original back injury?
TOM ALLISON
43. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 13.11 at 192.60 (1968).
